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Abstract
The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital
strategic interaction is analysed. When a pure labor managed duopoly is considered, firms choose
their capital commitments according to the level of the interest rate, unlike what usually happens
when only profit maximizing firms operate in the market. If we consider a mixed duopoly, the
profit maximizing firm underinvests as a reaction to the strategic asymmetry characterizing
competition in the quantity stage regardless of the rental cost of capital, while the investment
decision taken by the labor managed firm is again affected by the cost of capital. The nature of
competition between a PM and an LM firm is such that the LM firm is induced to set her own
capital in such a way that she does not enter the market.
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1. Introduction
When two firms compete over a two period horizon they may end up with a non optimal
choice of the stock of capital as compared to what required by cost minimization. There results
an excess of investment owing to strategic interaction in capital expenditure when an increase
in capital lowers marginal costs. Under Cournot competition there is usually a monotonic
relationship between the output and the profit of each firm. As a consequence, a spillover effect
is going to determine a capital commitment which is beyond the efficient level. This result
appears when profit maximizer firms (PM) compete over quantities in a Cournot two stage game
(Brander and Spencer, 1983), due to the strategic substitutability characterizing competition in
quantities in the market stage.
Our purpose is to see whether the same result extends to firms with a different objective
function due to a particular ownership structure. First of all our extension entails the analysis
of a duopoly made up by two Labor Managed firms (LM). Then, we focus on the strategic
interaction between a PM firm and an LM firm. It is known (see Cremer and Crémer, 1992;
Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Rossini and Scarpa, 1993) that competition with or between LM
firms gives rise to a strategic behaviour that largely differs from that observed when only profit
seeking firms operate in the market. Relying on this feature, we will show that in a pure duopoly
made up by LM firms, the investment decisions made by LM firms is conditional upon the level
of the cost of capital. This feature may rescue the LM firm from some of the inefficiencies for
which she is usually blamed. However, this "prudential" behaviour of the LM firm is augmented
in the case of competition with a PM firm. We show, in a mixed duopoly setting, that a profit
seeking firm underinvests respect to what would be required to minimize total costs, when she
competes with a cooperative firm. This is the opposite of what happens when the rival is a PM
firm. Despite the increased plausibility of the behaviour of the PM firm, the corresponding
attitute of the LM firm leads to a radical result as far as the optimal level of capital is concerned.
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For a reasonable set of parameters, the LM firm is going not to enter the market, when facing
competition with a PM firm in quantities and capital expenditure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the analysis of a duopoly made
up by cooperative firms. The competition between a PM and an LM firm is described in Section
3. Section 4 provides the result of numerical simulations pointing to the disappearance of the
LM firm. Section 5 contains final comments.
2. The two stage Cournot game between LM firms
We consider two LM firms with the usual objective function represented by profit per
worker
where qi is the quantity sold by the ith firm, p is the market price , r is the price of capital, ki is
the amount of capital used in the production process and Li is the quantity of labor utilized.
We assume that the size of the market is represented by a linear demand function
where Q=q1+q2 and a>Q.
We then assume a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale
Vi =
pqi − rki
Li
, i = 1, 2, (1
p = a − Q , (2
qi = √kiLi (3
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from which we obtain
We can then write the objective function of the LM firm as
Now we consider a duopoly made up by two LM firms that are identical in all respects.
Competition takes place in two stages following a Cournot scheme. The two firms set the level
of their physical capital in the first stage and in the second stage they decide their output levels.
The solution concept is two-stage subgame perfect equilibrium solved via backward
induction, leading to the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1. In a pure LM duopoly, firms treat quantities as strategic complements
in the market stage. As far as capital expenditure is concerned, they show a sensitiveness to the
rental cost of capital, by underinvesting when it is above a critical threshold and overinvesting
otherwise.
PROOF. We firstly find the optimal quantity by solving the first order condition (FOC) for the
market stage:
Li =
qi2
ki
(4
Vi =
[(a − qi − qj)qi − rki]ki
qi2
(5
∂Vi
∂qi
=
[(a − 2qi − qj)qi2] − 2qi[(a − qi − qj)qi − rki]
qi4
= 0, (6
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from which we can get the best response function for firm i
This means that LM firms treat quantities as strategic complements, while in case of profit
maximizing behaviour, quantities are strategic substitutes (cfr. Brander and Spencer, 1983,
pp.227-8).1 The equilibrium quantity for firm i is
provided that
We are now in a position to proceed to some comparative statics on quantities. From (8)
the following conditions emerge:
notice that the sign of the cross derivative is opposite to that observed when quantity
competitionoccurs between profit maximizing firms (cfr. Brander and Spencer, 1983, pp.227-8).
qi =
2rki
a − qj
(7
qi
*
=
1
2a
a 2 + 2r(ki − kj) − √(2r(ki − kj) − a 2)2 − 8rkj (8
(2r(ki − kj) − a 2)
2
− 8a 2kir > 0. (9
∂qi
∂ki
> 0;
∂qi
∂kj
> 0; (10
∂qi/∂kj
1. The concept of strategic complementarity/substitutability is due to Bulow et al. (1985).
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Provided that quantities are strategic complements, an increase in firm j’s investment shifts out
her reaction function in the quantity space, yielding thus an increase in firm i’s output.
Going backwards we can get the optimal level of ki by maximizing Vi with respect to
capital. The FOC relative to the first stage of the game is
The expression in square brackets is nil since it corresponds to Hence, condition (11)
can be solved to obtain the optimal level of firm i’s capital:
Going back to the cost function and assuming that the labor wage is normalised to one,
we get
and then
The above derivative is strictly positive if
∂Vi
∂ki
= −2rki + pqi
2 + k
∂qi
∂ki
2rki − pqi + qi
2 ∂p
∂qi
 + kiqi
2 ∂p
∂qj
∂qj
∂ki
= 0. (11
∂Vi/∂qi.
ki
*
=
pqi
2r − qi
∂p
∂qj
∂qj
∂ki
. (12
Ci =
qi2
ki
+ rki (13
∂Ci
∂ki
|
ki
*= rp 2 −
2r + qi
∂qj
∂ki

2
+ 2p
2r + qi
∂qj
∂ki

∂qi
∂ki
∂ki
∂kj
(14
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while it is negative when the interest rate lies outside the roots interval. Since the smaller root
defined in (15) is negative, the implication of the above condition is that LM firms initially
overinvest in phisycal capital when its cost is sufficiently low, while they underinvest when the
cost of capital grows beyond the threshold defined above. Q.E.D.
Theseresults sharply contrastwith the conclusions reached byBrander andSpencer (1983),
where profit seeking behaviour and Cournot competition lead firms to overinvest regardless of
the cost of capital.2
3. The mixed duopoly case
Now we wish to analyse the strategic interaction between a PM and an LM firm, as far as
capital expenditure is concerned. A case of simple strategic interaction between PM and LM
firms has already been investigated by Cremer and Crémer (1992); Delbono and Rossini (1992).
Moving from a pure LM duopoly to a mixed PM-LM duopoly has a beneficial impact on
equilibrium values as far as social welfare is concerned (see Rossini and Scarpa, 1993, p.202).
However, we do not know whether the extension of interaction to capital commitment leads to
r ∈] 18
 p
2 + 4p
∂qi
∂ki
∂ki
∂kj
− 4qi
∂qj
∂ki
± p√p 2 + 8p ∂qi∂ki ∂ki∂kj + 16 ∂qi∂ki ∂ki∂kj  2 − 8qi ∂qj∂ki  [, (15
2. The adoption of Betrand competition between profit maximizing firms in the market
stage would lead to the opposite result, i.e., underinvestment (see Dixon, 1985).
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results which mimic the previous ones.
We label the LM and the PM firm as 1 and 2, respectively. We specify only the objective
function of the PM firm, since that of the LM firm has already been defined in (1):
The equilibrium concept is defined as above. The outcome of the two-stage competition
between the Lm and the PM firm is summarized by the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2. In the mixed duopoly regime, the LM firm has an increasing reaction
function while the PM firm has a decreasing reaction function in the market stage. When facing
the capital commitment decision, the LM firm takes into account the cost of capital, while the
PM firm underinvests irrespectively of the cost of capital.
PROOF. From the FOCs we derive the following reaction functions in quantities:
INSERT FIGURE 1
pi2 = (a − q1 − q2)q2 −
q22
k2
− rk2 (16
q1 =
2rk1
a − q2
(LM) (17
q2 =
k2(a − q1)
2(1 + k2) (PM) (18
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As we can see from Figure 1, the reaction function of the PM firm is downward sloping,
while that of the LM firm is upward sloping. By looking at (17-18), we see that the effect of a
change in capital expenditure for the LM firm leads to a new reaction function shifted to the
right, giving rise to another equilibrium in which the quantity produced by the LM firm increases,
while the quantity produced by the PM firm decreases. We are then able to claim that
On the other hand, if we consider an increase in the capital commitment of the PM firm,
the effect on the equilibrium output will be definitely an increase in the quantities produced by
both firms,3 so that
Now we have to go back to the first stage and solve for the optimal levels of capital
commitments. The FOCs are:
∂q2
∂k1
|k2< 0. (19
∂q1
∂k2
|k1> 0. (20
3. The same would obtain through the delegation of control to a manager characterized
by a utility function partially dependent on the output level. See Vickers (1985); and Stewart
(1992) for the strategic use of delegation with LM firms.
8
where fci and vci represent firm i’s fixed and variable costs, respectively. In order to assess the
sign of (21) and (22) we use the two FOCs obtained in the quantity stage which now appear as
Therefore (21) and (22) become:
We now need to evaluate the sign of the reaction of total costs to the change of the capital
expenditure in order to see whether each firm behaves efficiently or not, i.e., whether she over
or underinvests in capital to reduce marginal costs. The sign of (21’) is ambiguous; though,
provided that the cost function Ci has the form specified in (13), the FOC relative to the LM
firm can be rewritten as follows:
∂V1
∂k1
=
(fc1 − pq1) 
∂vc1
∂k1
+
∂vc1
∂q1
∂q1
∂k1

vc1
2 +
 p
∂q1
∂k1
−
∂fc1
∂k1
+ q1
 ∂p∂q1
∂q1
∂k1
+
∂p
∂q2
∂q2
∂k1

vc1
= 0; (21
∂pi2
∂k2
= p
∂q2
∂k2
+ q2

∂p
∂q2
∂q2
∂k2
+
∂q1
∂k2
∂p
∂q1
 −
∂vc2
∂k2
−
∂q2
∂k2
∂vc2
∂q2
−
∂fc2
∂k2
= 0, (22
∂V1
∂q1
= vc1
 p + q1
∂p
∂q1
 − pq1
∂vc1
∂q1
+ fc1
∂vc1
∂q1
= 0 (23
∂pi2
∂q2
= p + q2
∂p
∂q2
−
∂vc2
∂q2
= 0 (24
∂V1
∂k1
= fc1
∂vc1
∂k1
− pq1
∂vc1
∂k1
− vc1
∂fc1
∂k1
+ vc1q1
∂p
∂q2
∂q2
∂k1
= 0 (21’
∂pi2
∂k2
= q2
∂q1
∂k2
∂p
∂q1
−
∂vc2
∂k2
−
∂fc2
∂k2
= 0 (22’
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which is positive if
Hence, in the interval specified by (25), i.e., when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the LM
firm overinvests, otherwise she underinvests.
As for the PM firm, from (22’) we can get
which implies that the PM firm underinvests irrespectively of the cost of capital. Q.E.D.
Hence, competition against an LM firm induces a reversal in the investment policy adopted
by the PM firm, due to the opposite slopes of the reaction functions in the quantity stage.
Underinvestment by the PM firm reveals a scarcely aggressive strategy by the same firm. Is
there any economic justification beyond the analytical fundamentals? The reason is quite simple,
and comes from the behaviour of the LM firm, which is trapped in its radical underinvestment
that dramatically reduces her size and therefore her ability to represent a fierce competitor for
the PM firm. In the next Section, we shall see that the LM firm is actually going to become
much less of a competitor.
∂V1
∂k1
= r
k1
∂vc1
∂k1
− vc1
 − pq1
∂cv1
∂k1
+ cv1q1
∂p
∂q2
∂q2
∂k1
(21"
0 < r <
pq1
∂vc1
∂k1
− vc1q1
∂p
∂q2
∂q2
∂k1
k1
∂vc1
∂k1
− vc1
(25
∂C2
∂k2
=
∂vc2
∂k2
+
∂fc2
∂k2
= q2
∂q1
∂k2
∂p
∂q1
< 0, (22"
10
4. Entry/exit decision by the LM firm
Theeffect of competition upon the behaviourof a LM firm is different according to whether
the rival is either a PM or a LM firm. Specifically, when we consider a one-stage competiton
in quantities between an LM and a PM firm, the LM firm benefits since she increases her level
of activity as compared with the level of production activated when competing against a similar
firm in a pure LM duopoly (see Delbono and Rossini, 1992). However, when competition
stretches over two stages, the outcome changes drastically, because output levels are largely
predetermined by the strategic commitments emerged in the previous stage. Since there exists
a positive relationship between capital and output, and the LM firm correctly anticipates that
she will compete with a larger rival in the market stage, her own likely underinvestment may
yield extreme consequences as far as her ability to survive is concerned. How dramatic is the
reduction in capital commitment undertaken by the LM in a mixed duopoly? We try and answer
this question since the result may go far beyond the simple behaviour we have described before.
Indeed, the competition extended to the capital commitment uncovers a surprising behaviour
of the LM firm. By simulating numerically the competitive behaviour of the LM for a plausible
range of the cost of capital, given the size of the market, we find that the LM firm reacts to the
capital choice of the PM by disinvesting sharply, reaching negative levels of capital. This means
that the LM firm is not able to survive competition with a PM firm, when starting from scratch.
The LM firm is so much "prudential" that it doesn’t enter the market. In table 1 below we provide
the most significant results of the numerical simulations we have undertaken.
INSERT TABLE 1
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The contents of Table 1 suggest a few considerations.
The level of capital becomes negative for the LM firm as a result of strategic competition with
the PM firm. This is due to the very low quantity chosen by the LM firm. When this firm produces
a low quantity she is compelled to sell some of her capital to maximize the individual value.
However, the negativity of the LM capital prompts for some qualifications of the above
statements about the relationship between the cost of capital and the investment behaviour of
the LM firm. There is an inverse relationship between the cost of capital and the absolute value
of capital. The firm must compensate an increase in the cost of capital by reducing the amount
of capital she sells, i.e. there is an increase in the capital committment. In section 3, we observed
a direct relationship between quantity of the LM and the cost of capital: the increase of the cost
of capital boosts the revenue of the LM firm reducing furtherly the sale of capital needed to
maximize individual value added. As it emerges from the numerical results, the total capital
expenditure born by the LM firm, rk1, remains constant. Since revenue increases, individual
profits go the same way. The ultimate upshot is the euthanasia of the LM firm originated by the
too low level of strategic production. We then state the following:
CLAIM 1. The strategic interaction in capital and quantity between a PM and an LM
firm leads the LM to choose a negative level of capital, i.e., the LM firm does not enter the
market.
5. Conclusions
The introduction of LM firms into a two-stage model of strategic interaction gives rise to
a set of new insights. We show that the change of the objective function of the firm from PM
to LM makes the cost of capital a relevant determinant of the degree of inefficiency as far as
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the dimension of the firm is concerned: there are levels of the rental price of capital which are
compatible with efficient capital commitment, when a pure LM duopoly is considered.
If we turn to a mixed duopoly made up by an LM and a PM firm, the LM firm still exhibits
a sensitiveness to the cost of capital, while the PM firm underinvests all over the range of capital
rental prices. The force driving this outcome is the existence of a strategic asymmetry between
the PM and the LM firm in the quantity space. Since the reaction function of the LM firm in the
market stage is upward sloping, the PM firm correctly anticipates that an increase in her own
quantity causes an increase in the rival’s quantity as well. The astonishing follow-up of this
strategic reaction is the sharp shrinking of the LM capital commitment beyond the level ensuring
her survival. This opens the way either to the internal reorganization of the LM firm, or the her
complete dismissal, leaving the PM firm free to operate as a monopolist. This perspective could
also be analysed in a dynamic framework, in order to investigate the characteriscitcs of the
disinvestment process by the LM firm, ultimately leading the LM firm to disappear.
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Figure 1. Reaction functions in the quantity space
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a=10 r=0.1 r=0.2 r=0.5 r=0.8
k2=4 -105.47 -52.73 -21.09 -13.18
k2=9.9 -74.94 -37.47 -14.99 -9.37
Table 1. Simulation on capital commitment.
The entries give the optimal capital by the LM firm.
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